Dog Searches in Schoolrooms—State or Private Action? by Ditzler, Margaret Beth
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 15 
Number 1 Fall 1980 pp.137-166 
Fall 1980 
Dog Searches in Schoolrooms—State or Private Action? 
Margaret Beth Ditzler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret Beth Ditzler, Dog Searches in Schoolrooms—State or Private Action?, 15 Val. U. L. Rev. 137 
(1980). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/4 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
NOTES
DOG SEARCHES IN SCHOOLROOMS-STATE
OR PRIVATE ACTION?
In 1949 the Supreme Court for the first time applied the fourth
amendment' to the states.2 At that time, however, the Supreme
Court did not mandate a specific remedy for violations of the fourth
amendment, but instead left the remedy to the discretion of the in-
dividual state courts.' In 1961 the Supreme Court reviewed its
previous holding and found that alternative state remedies had "failed
to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions."4 Therefore,
in an effort to uphold uniform and complete application of the fourth
amendment in state courts, the Supreme Court stated that "all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution is, by that same authority inadmissible in a state court."5
Thus, preliminary to any decision on the constitutionality of a
search is a determination of whether the questionable search was
undertaken by a state or federal governmental agent. Unless it is
determined that the search and seizure was under the guise of state
or federal law, the fourth amendment does not apply.
Recently a United States district court was required to deter-
mine whether the fourth amendment applies to dog searches in
public schools, instigated by a local school board.' The court was
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their homes, houses, effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
son or things to be seized.
2. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Arbitrary invasion into privacy by
the police is prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3. Id at 28-33. While the doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), making evidence secured in violation of the fourth amendment inadmissible in
federal courts is adhered to, it is not imposed on the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 25.
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). Evidence obtained by a search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a state court as it is in
a federal court.
5. Id. at 665.
6. Doe v. Renfrow, No. H 79-233 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, No. 79-2116 (7th Cir. 1980).
Ditzler: Dog Searches in Schoolrooms—State or Private Action?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
138 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
forced, as other courts will be in the future, to assess whether a
mass search for drugs by school officials, with the aid of trained
canine units, was an official governmental search or merely a search
by private citizens.7 In determining this issue a court must examine
not only the validity of a search by a public school official, but also
must face the added complexities of the propriety of the use of dogs
in a mass student search.' This note will examine the status of the
public school official under the fourth amendment and explain the
effect that the use of trained dogs will have on that status.
THE STATUS OF THE SCHOOL OFFICIAL
The fourth amendment was once applicable only to the federal
government.9 Through the application of the Due Process Clause'0 it
now applies to any action taken by state governmental agents." The
fourth amendment, however, does not apply to action .undertaken by
a private person. Any private action, therefore, while possibly giv-
7. During 1978, the Highland, Indiana School Administration became increas-
ingly aware of an acute problem of illicit drug use in the school system. Facing a loss
of discipline and morale among the students, the Highland School District Board decid-
ed to use trained dogs in a school wide drug investigation. The School Board requested
the assistance of the Highland Police Department, and the use of trained canine units,
dogs trained in connection with the Highland Police Department. The objective was to
rid the school system of illicit drug use. It was agreed beforehand that evidence un-
covered would not be used in any criminal investigation.
The entire student body was restricted to their first period class while the
dogs were led through the classrooms. If the dogs "alerted" (a reaction by the dog to
the smell of marijuana) to a particular student, that student was required to empty
either pocket or purse. If the dog continued to alert, the student was escorted to a
private room and strip searched. There was no marijuana found on any student that
was strip searched. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against further use of the dogs
in the classroom and claimed that their fourth amendment rights had been violated.
Doe v. Renfrow, No. H 79-233 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 1979), aff'd in par, rev'd in par No.
79-2116 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. The Renfrow court did not actually examine the status of a search by a
high school official under the fourth amendment. The court did decide that the action
of the school officials was reasonable under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
9. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (held that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not guarantee against state action all that would be a violation of the
original bill of rights if done by the federal government); Gaines v. Washington, 277
U.S. 81 (1928).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ing rise to a civil suit"2 is not subject to constitutional proscription,
and any evidence uncovered in such a search is not excluded in
either state or federal courts on the basis of a violation of the fourth
amendment.'" Therefore, before a decision on the constitutionality of
a search can be reached, it must first be determined whether the
one conducting the search is a state agent acting under the direc-
tives of the fourth amendment, or merely a private individual ex-
empt from the restrictions of the constitutional provisions."'
Recent case law indicates that courts are undecided whether a
public official is an agent of the state.'" Three basic views
predominate in the state and federal courts." Louisiana courts hold
that school officials are state officials to whom the fourth amend-
ment applies in full." Other jurisdictions hold that teachers are not
state officials, but are merely private citizens, and not bound by the
fourth amendment. 8 Finally, the most widely regarded view is that
teachers are state officials, but they are judged under a different
standard than other state officials.19 The doctrine of in loco parentis,
applicable in the school setting, lowers the constitutional require-
ment of probable cause to reasonable suspicion.2" Under this stan-
dard a teacher is allowed to search any student if the teacher has a
reasonable suspicion that the student is engaged in proscribed con-
duct.
School Officials Considered State Officials
The fourth amendment guarantees against all unreasonable
searches and seizures.2' The language does not single out searches
12. Potts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Penn. 1973). A student was allowed
to bring a civil suit against the Chief of Police and the Superintendent of the School
District for violation of her civil rights when she was subjected to a strip search while
at school.
13. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
14. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967), in which a
motel owner on his own initiative searched a travelling case that the defendant had
left behind and discovered several forged checks which he turned over to the police.
The evidence was admissible because it was uncovered during a private search.
15. Belliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
16. A fourth view is found in State v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318
N.E.2d 866 (1974). The Wingerd court held that the fourth amendment applies to
school officials but the exclusionary rule cited in Mapp v. Ohio does not. See note 4
supra and accompanying text.
17. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 319 (La. 1975).
18. In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
19. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
20. Id at 911, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
21. See note 1 supra.
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by law enforcement officers, or searches designed solely to obtain
criminal convictions."2 Indeed, since the fourteenth amendment has
been brought to bear on "state actions," the proscribed "state
actions" have been construed to cover any public official's action on
behalf of any state or any of its administrative agencies.23
A school Board of Education is considered one of a state's ad-
ministrative agencies. An examination of the educational laws of the
various states readily shows that states are inextricably entwined in
their public school systems." Each state has compulsory education
requirements for chiildren between the ages of seven and sixteen.25
The state supplies revenue to support public schools and to pay the
salaries of the teachers, and therefore may justly claim the right to
prescribe the qualifications of the teachers, and to name the condi-
tions of the educational curriculum." State action exists when the
wrongdoer's action is clothed with the authority of the state.'
Therefore, since school officials are regulated by and derive their
authority from state law they are acting only under the authority of
state laws when they act to enforce a school policy. Such action by
the school official can be classified as state action.
In deciding the validity of the search of a high school student's
personal possessions by a school teacher, the Louisiana Supreme
Court looked to the authority given by the state to the school of-
ficial.28 Under the Louisiana Code' a school official is charged with
the responsibility of implementing the state's policies in the educa-
22. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 753 (1974).
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (school boards may not prohibit freedom of expression absent evidence of
substantial interference with school discipline); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (invalidity of warrantless searches by city housing inspector).
24. See, e.g., -ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 to 1214 (1975); IND. CODE §§
20-1-1-2 to -13-30-2 (1976 & Supp. 1979); New York Compensatory Education Provision,
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 1970).
25. Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
26. 1d..
27. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court reaffirms its position that
action taken "under color of state law" refers to any power or misuse of power made
possible only because the actor is clothed with the authority of state law. The Court
explicitly rejected the idea that "state action" should be construed to mean only that
power taken in accordance with state law and excluding any offense outside of state
law, even though taken with the authority of state law. Id. at 172-84.
28. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d at 319.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:1-:3454 (West 1963 & Supp. 1979).
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tional system. By state law, teachers are authorized to hold every
pupil to a strict accountability for disorderly conduct while at
school. Principals may suspend students for directly violating school
policies." The state Board of Education is required to prescribe
specific courses of study. 1 The court therefore concluded that school
officials are strictly accountable to the state, and insofar as they are
discharging their duties by enforcing state policies and regulations,
are within the purview of the fourth amendment's prohibitions. Con-
sequently, the court held that the Louisiana student has a constitu-
tional right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures
equivalent to that of an adult.
If the fourth amendment applies in full, as held by the Loui-
siana court, then any search conducted without a warrant is per se
unconstitutional32 unless it falls within one of the "specifically
established and well delineated exceptions" to the warrant require-
ment.33 The Supreme Court has created only a few exceptions in
which a government official may search without a warrant. An ar-
resting officer may search a person arrested in order to find hidden
weapons.' An officer in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect may make
30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416 (West Supp. 1979).
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:262 (West Supp. 1979).
32. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886).
33. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Supreme Court
stated in Coolidge:
[Tihe most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
ject only to a few well established and well delineated exceptions. The ex-
ceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," and there must be a show-
ing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative. "The burden is on those seeking the exemp-
tion to show the need for it." In times of unrest, whether caused by crime
or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the
values that it represents may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to
some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental Con-
stitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our own they won-by
legal and Constitutional means in England, and by revolution on this con-
tinent- a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official
power. If times have changed, reducing everyman's scope to do as he
pleases in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made the
values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less important.
Id. at 454, 455 (footnotes omitted).
34. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969), the Supreme Court
held that "[wihen an arrest is made it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested, in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect escape." The officer may also look for and seize any
19801
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a search of any premises in which the suspect may reasonably be
hiding.1 If an officer reasonably believes that an armed robbery is
about to occur he may "stop and frisk" an individual to prevent the
robbery." Border searches37 and searches under authority of military
law' are also made exceptions to the warrant requirement. In all of
these exceptions the Court recognizes the existence of "exigent cir-
cumstances" which make it impossible for an officer to obtain a war-
rant in time to prevent criminal activity. 9
A student search is not one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The same exigent circumstances as detailed above do
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
The Court allowed this search to be extended to an area "within his immediate
control" and construed this area to include the "sphere around his person from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." The Court
strictly limited this area and found no justification for a routine warrantless search of
any room other than that in which the arrest occurs. Similiarly, no justification could
be found for searching desk drawers and other concealed areas within the room itself.
Id at 763.
35. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment does not require
police officers to delay in the course of an investigation, if to do so would gravely en-
danger their lives or the lives of others. This "hot pursuit" exception recognizes that
speed is often essential to reduce the likelihood of a criminal doing further damage to
society. Under such circumstances a search to discover a fleeing suspect is not in-
validated by the lack of a warrant. The permissible scope of a search must be at least
as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the danger that the suspect may
resist or escape. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
36. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court determined that an
officer is allowed to stop and frisk a suspect without probable cause. The necessity for
preventing an armed robbery outweighs the minimal intrusion in a frisk for weapons.
The Court used an "objective reasonable man" standard to determine whether there
was reasonable cause to believe the individual searched was armed, and whether the
search itself was reasonable under the circumstances.
37. Another exception is found in cases involving border searches. Because of
the overriding interest in protecting territorial integrity in the United States,
authorizations of border searches were in effect before the ratification of the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, Ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43. It is generally ac-
cepted that a search by a customs official at the time and place of entering the United
States need not be supported by probable cause. "Unsupported" or "mere" suspicions
alone are sufficient to justify such a search for purposes of Customs Law enforcement.
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977
(1966).
38. Searches conducted in accordance with military law and under the direc-
tion of proper military authority may be conducted without probable cause. In United
States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1974), the court held that a commanding
officer has the unqualified right to enter and search the quarters of military personnel.
Likewise, a military picket is authorized to search any automobile entering a military
reservation. The court held that these searches, lawful and valid under military law,
are reasonable, and thus do not fall under the prohibitions of the fourth amendment.
39. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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not apply to the student search. The student is already under the
control of the school authorities and may be detained until the war-
rant is obtained. If the school official is acting as an extension of the
state he must operate within the restrictions of the fourth amend-
ment. Since there is no exception to the fourth amendment for stu-
dent searches, the school official may search students only under the
same circumstances that a law enforcement officer may act.'
Teachers Are Not State Officials
The Louisiana court's view that a school official is absolutely
restricted by the fourth amendment contrasts sharply with the view
followed by California and Texas. These courts begin with the
premise that a public official is not a state agent." A review of the
pertinent cases, however, fails to disclose any logic for this premise.
One court rationalized that in any school search the purpose of the
investigation is not to aid law enforcement agencies, but rather to
maintain discipline in the interest of an orderly school operation and
to secure evidence of student misconduct." Because the purposes of
40. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975).
41. This view that a school official acts outside the authority of government
as a private citizen has been highly criticized in Buss, note 22 supra. The author
states:
The private citizen theory seems to have been extended to a point
of ultimate absurdity by the courts in Mercer v. State and In re C. The
Mercer court said the searching principal was not acting as an arm of
government because he was acting in loco parentis. The court's reasoning,
in other words, is that because a parent would not exercise governmental
power, the principal acting in the parent's place does not either. It is dif-
ficult to see whether the court's reasoning is more objectionable because
of the overblown view of in loco parentis or because of its totally illogical
conclusion. The flaw in the reasoning may be too obvious to clarify with
exegesis, but the following may prove useful. Under a system of com-
pulsory education, a school authority acquires power over the child direct-
ly by reason of law, and solely because that authority is the agent of the
governmental branch charged with carrying out the law. It seems
unhelpful to call this in loco parentis. But it is errant nonsense to
characterize this governmentally derived power as in loco parentis and
then to deny its governmental origins.
Id at 767.
42. In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1969).
The court goes on to add that the fact that evidence of crime is uncovered and pro-
secutions result from a search by a school official should not make the search and
seizure unreasonable. The court appears to be looking at the reasonableness of the
search to justify the school official's action. However, if the court were true to its
preliminary premise this would not be necessary. If the school official is not a state of-
ficial it makes no difference how unreasonable the search is; conduct of a person not
acting under the authority of a state is not proscribed by the fourth amendment.
There are no state standards for search and seizure by a private citizen who is not
1980]
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the school official are different from those of law enforcement, the
school official somehow remains free from state authority. The
courts have apparently equated state authority with state law en-
forcement, and as school officials do not act with the intent to fur-
ther the aims of law enforcement they act as private citizens under
the fourth amendment.
A second rationalization for the holding that a teacher is not a
state agent is found in the doctrine of in loco parentis. Several
jurisdictions hold that a teacher is deemed to stand in the place of
the parent in regard to authority over the child. 3 The teacher
derives authority from the ancient doctrine of in loco parentis,"'
whereby the parent impliedly delegates authority to the teacher. In
acting to discipline the student the teacher is merely operating as a
parent, and does not come under the prohibitions of the fourth
amendment. Although in loco parentis has been codified into public
law in many states,'5 theoretically any discipline used by the teacher
stems from the parent. As the parent is outside the arm of govern-
ment in the discipline of a child, so too should be the teacher.
This view that in loco parentis grants similiar immunities to
both parent and teacher is not logically consistent. The analysis
breaks down when one contends that a parent, merely by sending a
child to school, has transferred all parental rights to school
authorities who assume these same rights. There are many parental
responsibilities which teachers cannot assume. School officials may
not administer medication to a child unless authorized by parent or
physician." In some states corporeal punishment will not be ad-
acting as an agent of the state; therefore a determination of reasonableness is not ap-
plicable.
43. Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
44. The doctrine of in loco parentis was established at common law and men-
tioned by Blackstone:
[The parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, dur-
ing his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to
his charge, viz, that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to
answer the purposes for which he is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 453-54 (1st ed. 1897). For a broad historical analysis
of the in loco parentis doctrine, see Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of In-
terests, 61 ILL. B.J. 638 (1973).
45. See, e.g., 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1317 (Purdon Supp. 1979), which
grants teachers in public schools "the same authority as to conduct and behavior over
the pupils . . .'as the parents . . . may exercise over them," (limited to those powers
necessary to the effectuation of the school's purposes).
46. Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d at 720.
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ministered without express parental consent. 7 A teacher may not
force religious or patriotic beliefs upon a child against his wishes. 8
Likewise parents do not have the same responsibilities as the
teachers. Parents, while having the right to search their children,
also have the right to remain silent as to any incriminating evidence
they might find.49 Teachers have no similiar rights to silence. There-
fore, merely because a school official acts in loco parentis under
both common law and state law, it is not settled that he may act
with complete parental authority. A teacher may discipline in a man-
ner sufficient to create a healthy environment for the students,
much as a parent may discipline a child to create a healthy home en-
vironment. But when a school official searches a child and turns
over incriminating evidence to the police, the authority of in loco
parentis has been extended beyond its natural boundaries" and the
search becomes antagonistic to the theory itself.51
Using the in loco parentis doctrine to circumvent the fourth
amendment in student searches disregards the doctrine's own limita-
tions. At common law it was explicit that a schoolmaster received
authority to restrain and correct a child only to the extent
47. Id.
48. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969). The Supreme Court held that school authorities could not make regulations pro-
hibiting students from protesting the war in Vietnam, because as long as the students
were not disruptive their conduct was within the Free Speech Clause of the first
amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
49. A parent is not considered an accessory to the crime merely by remaining
silent. See Villareal v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 368, 182 S.W. 322 (1916), in which a father
concealing the fact that his son had killed a person was not charged as an accessory to
the crime.
50. Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d at 721.
51. Comment, Search and Seizure-School Officials' Authority to Search
Students is Augmented by the In Loco Parentis Doctrine, 5 FLA. L. REV. 526, 531
(1977) (footnotes omitted):
Using the in loco parentis doctrine as a basis for student searches
disregards the history of the doctrine and is in direct conflict with its
underlying theory. To stand "in the place of the parent" implies that one
is to look after the child's best interest in the same manner as a parent. It
is unlikely that most parents would believe it to be in the best interest of
the child to search him for drugs to use against him in a criminal trial.
Most parents probably do not believe that a criminal conviction or deter-
mination of delinquency benefits a child and would rather seek other
remedies. Additionally, it cannot be assumed that a parent would volun-
tarily provide the police with drugs obtained from their children. Actually
the converse is true; most parents would probable elect not to turn their
children in.
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necessary to implement the learning process.2 The authority to
punish for non-educational purposes was not delegated to the
teacher but was retained by the parent. While the school official
may be acting under a quasi-immunity when functioning within the
confines of the in loco parentis doctrine, this immunity extends no
farther than the doctrine's set limitations. Any conduct beyond the
duty to restrain and correct a student for educational purposes will
be sanctioned under the teacher's concurrent role as a state official.
Therefore, while the doctrine of in loco parentis may give school of-
ficials a great deal of control over the students, it does not follow
that it authorizes student searches which may lead to the discovery
of drugs or other contraband and in turn to criminal prosecution.
Unless an alternative theory is followed, the school official will again
be restricted to the fourth amendment prohibitions in anything
other than educational discipline.
Teachers as State Officials but Held to a Lower Standard of
Reasonable Suspicion
A third and better view combines both previously mentioned
theories on the status of the school official. This view is expressed
in the oft-cited New York case, People v. Jackson.' The court began
with the premise that a school official is a state agent who, without
special circumstances, is confined to the strict probable cause re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. The in loco parentis doctrine,
however, is so compelling, in light of public necessity and as a social
concept antedating the fourth amendment, that any action, including
a search taken thereunder upon a reasonable suspicion, should be ac-
cepted as necessary and reasonable.'
Because the Constitution forbids only unreasonable searches,
the Jackson court proposes a balancing test, in light of the extraor-
dinary circumstances of the school environment, to determine what
would be a reasonable search. On one hand, it cannot be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights merely
by entering an environment different than society at large.5 Yet the
law is clear that in some situations search and seizure is allowed on
52. See note 45 supra.
53. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
54. Id. at 914, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736. Since the fourth amendment forbids only
unreasonable searches and seizures, the court proposes a case by case analysis to
determine if a particular student search was reasonable under the circumstances.
55. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503.
(1969).
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less than traditional standards of probable cause, because the in-
terests of government and society outweigh the intrusion." One
court engaging in a balancing test to determine the adequacy of
cause to search for marijuana on the basis of odor alone redefined
probable cause as reasonable cause.57 The court held that if there is
adequate reasonable cause to search, the search will not violate the
fourth amendment. Adequacy of cause and reason depends on balanc-
ing the needs of law enforcement against the individual's right to be
protected against undue invasion of reasonably expected privacy.
This redefinition of "probable cause" to "reasonable cause" is
not a subjective definition looking into the officer's good faith, but
rather an objective one, measured by a standard determined by the
court based on its balancing of all the factors and its appraisal of
how a prudent person would view the facts. 9 The balance, then,
must be struck between the extent of invasion, the reasonableness
of the search in light of the circumstances, and the possible extent
of harm if the search is foregone. However, any proposed balancing
test would naturally be nebulous. One writer has expressed the fear
that a balancing of interests, combining the qualified immunity of
school teachers with a minimal standard of reasonableness and an
abandonment of the right to suppress evidence obtained under
unlawful searches would result in a lack of effective judicial sanc-
tions for violations of students' fourth amendment rights by a school
official." If a school official is held to be a state official under fourth
amendment prohibitions, and a student is deemed to have the con-
stitutional rights of an adult," the judicial interpretation of the rea-
sonableness of the interests of the student, and the reasonableness
of the interests of the school board will inevitably clash.2
56. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
57. People v. Hilber, 403 Mich. 312, 269 N.W.2d 159 (1978).
58. Id at 315, 269 N.W.2d at 162-63.
59. ld.
60. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, __, 216 S.E.2d 586, 601 (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975). Justice Gunter in a dissenting opinion expressed a
concern that the court in proposing its balancing test failed to balance the proper in-
terests. The majority claimed to be balancing the interests in the maintenance of order
and discipline in the public schools against the student's fourth amendment rights.
Justice Gunter, however, stated that the actual interests being balanced were the
acknowledgment and enforcement of the student's constitutional rights in a criminal
prosecution and the right to a fair prosecution and a fair trial against the state's in-
terest in a criminal conviction.
61. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
(1969).
62. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971).
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The school has been recognized as a unique environment which
alters the way the courts will look at the constitutional interests in-
volved. 3 Common experience requires recognition of the fact that
when large numbers of teenagers gather together, their inex-
perience and lack of mature judgment will often create hazards to
those in the group. 4 Since children are required by state law to go
to school, both the school and the state have the duty to see that
the children are protected while in the classroom. Parents who sur-
render their children to the school environment have a right to ex-
pect that certain safeguards will be taken by the school board and
the state to insure the child a proper education.
The corresponding duty of the school official is to maintain
discipline and to promote learning in the public school. But
discipline in the school often requires immediate action, and cannot
await the procurement of a search warrant based on probable
cause." If the teacher does not take immediate steps to investigate
possible crime he may violate his quasi-parental duty toward the
child. The in loco parentis doctrine gives the teacher the right to
take disciplinary action to maintain the educational environment of
the school. In acting upon this duty the teacher can be held only to a
reasonable good faith test to justify the student search if it is to be
at all feasible to maintain order.
The argument can be made that not only do the teachers have
a duty to search any child reasonably suspected of drug use, but
also that the child impliedly consents to this restriction of his liber-
ty and submits to all reasonable school regulations merely by
attending school." This argument fails when viewed in light of man-
datory school attendance. 7 It would be an extreme imposition to
force one to go to school and once there to give up constitutional
privileges otherwise retained if attendance was not mandatory. In
63. The Supreme Court recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Comm'unity School DisL, that the "special characteristics of the school environment"
must give rise to a balancing test in which the student's first amendment rights to
freedom of expression will often collide with the rules of the school authorities. Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 506-07.
64. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d at 322.
65. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
66. Several courts have allowed searches of students' lockers on the theory
that the students impliedly consent to actions taken by the school officials in an effort
to enforce school policy against drug possession. See, e.g., State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638,
456 P.2d 1 (1969); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 383 N.Y.S.2d 22,
(1967).
67. See note 21 supra.
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fact, the argument has been made that since school attendance is
mandatory, the courts should be even more diligent to protect
students' rights."
While school officials owe parents and society a duty to main-
tain discipline and an effective school environment, it is unclear how
far that duty extends. Clearly, random searches that are insufficient-
ly justified by the evidence are prohibited. 9 While the need for a
mass search within the school environment may be greater than the
need for one outside the school,7 the emotional damage inflicted by
a random search is extreme and may have unknown effects on the
children. 1
While searches based on insufficient evidence are not allowed,
some courts do not require even enough evidence to establish tradi-
tional probable cause. Instead these courts only require enough
evidence to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Un-
fortunately, this reasonable suspicion, or reasonable cause standard,
has never been specifically delineated with regard to student searches.
The cases relying on this reasonable cause standard are based on
varying degrees of what is a reasonable ground for a student search.
While the court opinions do not clarify the standard of reasonable
suspicion, a study of the facts of the individual cases may help to ar-
ticulate what is considered justifiable cause to search.
68. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 84, 558 P.2d at 790. But see State v.
Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975), for an opposite
view. The Young court emphasized that:
[Ilt is not merely the unruly or criminal student who is involun-
tarily in school. All the other students are there involuntarily also, and
are forced to associate with the criminal few-or perhaps merely the im-
mature or unwise few-closely and daily. The state owes those students a
safe and secure environment.
.Id. at 492, 216 S.E.2d at 592.
69. Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976). In Picha the court
determined that an unidentified telephone call; did not supply probable, or even
reasonable, cause to search students.
70. People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 488, 315 N.E.2d 466, 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403,
408 (1974).
71. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Roselli stated:
In my exploration of this subject I have found that the commen-
tators, both in the legal profession and in the education profession, are
not at all convinced that the denial of constitutional rights to students is
beneficial to the educational atmosphere or process, or that the gain in
discipline outweighs the loss of personal privacy and dignity. This loss, it
must be remembered, is felt by the innocent as well as the guilty.
State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 78, 558 P.2d at 784 (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps the strongest evidence giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion is actual observation of a possible crime by a principal or
teacher. One court has held that when both the Dean of Boys and an
instructor observed students smoking, and recognized the
characteristic smell of marijuana, the reasonable suspicion require-
ment had been satisfied."2 Any ensuing search was therefore con-
sidered valid. Another court, however, extended this idea of a
reasonable suspicion even further.73 An assistant principal had
observed furtive actions by one of a group of students, and for that
reason searched the student and his two companions. Marijuana was
found on one student. The record does not specify whether the stu-
dent drawing suspicion to the group was the one actually possessing
the marijuana, but the court intimated that the search of all three
students was reasonable and the evidence need not be excluded.7'
This court failed to define a furtive act and confused the defini-
tion of reasonable suspicion. The issue now becomes how furtive is
furtive enough to be reasonably suspicious. Another question raised is
whether a reasonable suspicion toward one student may be imputed to
his companions. The court failed to answer these questions.
Another case gives rise to further problems.75 Based on
unspecified information, a Coordinator of Discipline sought out a cer-
tain student and requested that the student accompany him back to
his office. En route the Coordinator noticed a bulge in the student's
pocket, and further observed him constantly putting his hand into
his pocket. Suddenly the student ran for the door. After a lengthy
chase the Coordinator and a police officer captured the student and
forced him to surrender drug paraphernalia.76 The court sustained
the student's conviction for the possession of contraband, holding
that the student's actions had satisfied the reasonable suspicion test.
The decision fails to clarify whether the unspecified information
alone would have given the Coordinator reasonable cause to search
the student, or whether the search was reasonable only after the
suspicious actions on the part of the student.
The previously mentioned decisions were based on a combina-
tion of information received by the school official and suspicious ac-
72. Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
73. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
74. I& at 496, 216 S.E.2d at 594.
75. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
76. Id. at 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
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tions on the part of the student involved. Yet mere information
alone has also been considered enough to give a principal a
reasonable suspicion of the criminal activity of a student." In one in-
stance the police received a telephone call from an informant who
related information about possible distribution of drugs in the school
by a specific student. The information included an accurate descrip-
tion of the suspected student's clothing, and even specified the
pocket where amphetamines were located. This information was
relayed to the high school principal who promptly searched the
described student and discovered in the identified pocket several
packets of amphetamines." Although the information in this case
was received via a police officer, other cases have held that informa-
tion via a student will also supply reasonable suspicion when the
student informant is known and reliable."9
These cases show that almost any evidence, however minimal,
will supply reasonable suspicion. Few cases have dealt with the
reasonableness of a search when no evidence has been found on the
student. At least one case allows the conclusion that the courts
would handle the problem much differently." In Picha v. Wieglos, a
phone call led the principal to suspect that three girls had drugs in
their possession. He called the police, and when they arrived the
girls were strip searched. No drugs were found.8 ' The court refused
to determine whether the phone call by itself was sufficient to give
the principal a reasonable suspicion to search. Instead the court
decided that since there was police involvement in the search both
police and principal would be held to a strict probable cause stan-
dard before a search would be allowed.
Another court has gone so far as to base the minimal standard
for student searches upon the teachers' "good faith exercise of their
public trust."" This standard is lower than the reasonable suspicion
77. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
78. Id. at 76, 558 P.2d at 782.
79. M. v. Board of Educ. Ball Chatham, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. 111. 1977). Peo-
ple v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 310, 333 N.E.2d 369, 372 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1975); People v.
Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970).
80. Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
81. Id. at 1216.
82. State v. Young, 234 Ga. at 495, 216 S.E.2d at 593-94. This decision was
highly criticized in Comment, Student Searches- The Fourth Amendment and the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 41 Mo. L. REv. 626 (1976). The writer stated that a reasonable suspi-
cion standard, rather than the good faith standard should be the minimal standard for
student searches. The reasonable suspicion standard adequately serves the state's in-
terest of maintaining order and discipline in the school while at the same time giving
the students fourth amendment protection from arbitrary searches by the school of-
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standard adopted by a majority of the courts which have held that
the school official is a governmental official subject to the fourth
amendment. 3 This good faith action by teachers and administrators
is subject only to minimal restraints necessary to insure that
"students are not whimsically stripped of personal privacy and sub-
jected to petty tyranny."" One recent case has found it necessary to
set limits on school officials' use of the good faith defense in searching
students. In Doe v. Renfrow,85 the court found a nude search of a
thirteen-year-old child to be an invasion of that child's constitutional
rights, and allowed her to seek damages for this invasion.
A summary of the cases supporting the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion shows that what is necessary on the part of the
school official is conduct carried out in good faith with at least some
evidence supporting the school official's suspicions toward the stu-
dent. The courts are just beginning to articulate what good faith
conduct would fail to meet the lesser standard of reasonable suspi-
cion. It has been argued that good faith is an inadequate standard of
reasonableness since good faith looks to the searcher's motive,
which may be entirely valid, and yet clearly beyond the bounds of
reason.
THE EFFECT OF THE USE OF DOGS ON THE STATUS OF THE SCHOOL
OFFICIAL
Courts have differed greatly on the status of the school official
under the fourth amendment. In the cases mentioned previously, the
focus has been directly on the school official, and his or her authori-
ty over the pupil. Serious questions are raised when the school of-
ficial attempts to extend that authority by obtaining the use of
trained dogs to aid in drug detection. The following section will
analyze the effect that the use of dogs will have on the legal status
of the school official under the fourth amendment. With very few ap-
pellate cases directly dealing with dog searches in the public
ficials. But a good faith standard guarantees no such protections. A school official could
possess a good faith belief in the need for a search, when in reality that good faith
belief may be based on nothing more than a "hunch," baseless rumors, or irrational
suspicions. Once a good faith standard is adopted there is no longer any objective
criteria by which the court can measure the reasonableness of the search. Id. at 630,
631.
83. Comment, supra note 82, at 627.
84. State v. Young, 234 Ga. at 495, 216 S.E.2d at 593.
85. Doe v. Renfrow, No. H 79-233 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 1979), aff'd in part. rev'd
in part No. 79-2116 (7th Cir. 1980).
86. See note 82 supra.
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schools, an attempt to analyze the effect of the change in the status
of the school official under each of the views outlined above will be
largely by analogy.
The Use of the Dogs Under a Strict Probable Cause Standard
The Louisiana courts consider the school official to be a state
official held to an absolute standard of probable cause. 7 According
to this view, the courts must find one of two things true to sustain
the use of dogs in public schools. The use of the dogs may be con-
sidered a search, an invasion of the student's "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy."88 If this is so, then the courts will require a strict
showing of probable cause before finding the use of the dogs valid.
If the use of dogs does not invade any "reasonable expectation of
privacy," then the use of the dogs will not be considered a search. If
there is no search, no constitutional determination will need to be
made.
In United States v. Solis, 9 a federal district court held that the
use of trained dogs to detect the presence of marijuana in the in-
terior of a trailer constituted an illegal search in the absence of a
warrant supported by probable cause. The defendant had parked the
locked trailer at the rear of a gasoline service station. The court
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that the area
behind the gasoline station would be treated as a private place and,
therefore, the use of the dogs invaded the defendant's privacy.90
This reasoning was based on Katz v. United States,9 which held
that the physical trespass doctrine previously adhered to in search
and seizure cases was no longer controlling.9 After Katz, any viola-
tion of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy would be
87. See notes 21-40 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text.
89. United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd 536 F.2d
880 (9th Cir. 1976).
90. 1& at 327.
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. Prior to Katz, the absence of any physical penetration into the area in
question foreclosed further fourth amendment inquiry. Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928). The amendment was thought to limit only searches and
seizures of tangible property based upon physical trespass. In Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court extended the fourth amendment to include the
recording of oral statements overheard without "technical trespass." Id. at 511. Then
in 1967, the Court in Katz expressly overruled the "physical trespass" doctrine and
emphasized that the fourth amendment protects people and not simply areas. Now
electronic monitoring may be considered a search if it intrudes into a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of the lack of physical trespass.
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considered a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The Supreme Court explained that, "[wlhat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of the Fourth
Amendment protection . . . but what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public may be constitu-
tionally protected.""3
Katz therefore has defined a search as a governmental intru-
sion into an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. In Solis the district court found that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in parking and locking his trailer
behind the gasoline service station. The use of dogs to sniff for mari-
juana was a search without probable cause and hence unconstitu-
tional.
A Court following the reasonable expectation argument in this
district court's decision in Solis would have to consider the degree
of expected privacy that the student has in the classroom. If indeed
the student has a justifiable expectation of privacy94 which the dogs
invade, then the use of the dogs will constitute a search. Unless
probable cause can be established upon the entire classroom of
students, or upon individual students prior to the search, the war-
rantless use of dogs to search for drugs will therefore be precluded.
The decision in Solis was overturned at the circuit level95 on
the ground that the use of the dogs was not an invasion of the
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, hence not a search.
The court instead found that the dogs were merely "monitoring the
air in an area open to the public in determining the possible ex-
istence of a criminal enterprise nearby."" The court emphasized that
the dogs alone did not establish the probable cause necessary to
search the trailer. The probable cause to search was based partly
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353.
94. Under the Katz "reasonable expectation" doctrine, the cases which deter-
mine whether governmental conduct constitutes a search and seizure can be divided in-
to two categories: those which utilize an objective emphasis, and those which utilize a
subjective emphasis. The objective approach is one in which it is decided or assumed
that the aggrieved party had an actual expectation of privacy; the inquiry of the court
is then whether that expectation was justifiable. The subjective approach, on the other
hand, is one in which the primary inquiry is whether the aggrieved party had an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy without considering whether the expectation
was justifiable. For further examination into the subjective-objective approach of the
Katz doctrine see, Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment-A Reasonable Expecta-
tion of Privacy, or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 63 (1974).
95. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
96. Id at 882.
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upon an informant's statement giving the drug agent a location and
description of the trailer supposedly containing marijuana bricks.
Also, talcum powder, a substance used to disguise the odor of mari-
juana, was clearly visible on the outside doors of the trailer. Finally,
the dogs alerted to the smell of the marijuana. The three cir-
cumstances taken together provided probable cause for the further
search of the trailer.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also determined
that the use of a dog to sniff the area outside of a storage locker
was not a search under the Katz interpretation." The areaway out-
side the locker was public property which, known to the defendant,
was occasionally patrolled by marijuana sniffing dogs at the consent
of the landlord. According to the court, the defendant had no
justifiable expectation of privacy in the areaway outside of the
locker, and thus the use of the dogs to patrol this area was not an
invasion of his constitutionally protected rights.98
The court held that the ensuing search of the defendant's
storage locker was also lawful, as it was made under valid probable
cause. Again, as in Solis, the probable cause was not based merely
on the alert by the dog. Local drug authorities had been keeping the
defendant under surveillance as a result of a previous drug arrest.
Based on their observations, the authorities brought the dogs to
verify their suspicions. The alert by the dog to the smell of mari-
juana was only one of a series of circumstances affording probable
cause to search the locker.
Following these decisions, a student search based entirely upon
the alert of a dog would not be allowed. The searching agent in Solis
had a reasonable foundation on which to particularize his search to
the individual trailer. The dogs alone did not establish probable
cause. Likewise, in a student search there must also be a reason to
single out a particular student as one probably possessing drugs.
Student searches are unique because generally there is not enough
evidence beforehand to supply strict probable cause to search.-The
dogs are used not as a reinforcement of a school official's suspicions
toward a particular student, but rather as the sole means of supply-
ing probable cause. While the issue of whether probable cause
should be supplied solely by an alert of the dog is beyond the scope
of this note," the case law to date does not support such a theory.
97. United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
98. Id. at 1006.
99. See Lederer & Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by Marijuana
Detection Dogs, April 1973 ARMY LAWYER 12, 14, for an examination of the question of
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Therefore, unless school officials have a strong suspicion that a stu-
dent has drugs in his possession, the alert by the dog alone is insuf-
ficient to supply the strict probable cause requirement.
At least one court was willing to admit that the use of dogs
was itself a search."'0 In State v. Elkins, a federal agent received an
anonymous phone call describing a certain parcel on an airlines car-
rier allegedly containing marijuana. The agent brought in a trained
dog to sniff the parcel. The dog immediately indicated the presence
of marijuana in the package. The court stated affirmatively that
such use of the dogs constituted a search.' The court went on to
find that such a search was reasonable under the circumstances
because a person transferring a parcel by a common carrier should
have no reason to object to having his package sniffed by a trained
dog.1"2 Any minimal intrusion by the dogs hurts only those persons
transporting marijuana. The innocent transferor is not injured, and
in fact is not even aware that his package has been searched by a
trained dog.
The invasion involved in a student search is not so minimal.
The search by the dogs affects the innocent student as well as the
one possessing marijuana. A mistake by the dog can force an inno-
cent student to undergo further search and possible humiliation.
Following the logic of the Elkins court, the use of dogs would be
considered a search. Therefore the use of the dogs will only be
allowed if the invasion is minimal and outweighed by the state's
need for the intrusion.
The preceding cases have dealt with situations in which dogs
were used to aid the law enforcement officer in establishing prob-
able cause. Courts holding to the Louisiana view, which considers
school officials as having the same status as law enforcement
agents,"3 will likewise be held to this strict probable cause standard.
If the use of dogs is considered a search the school official must
have enough prior information to supply the probable cause require-
ment with regard to that particular student. If that standard is met,
there would be no need for the dogs to further corroborate the of-
ficial's suspicions, and the official may search the student without
the dogs. If there is not probable cause to search the student the
whether an alert by a dog will provide probable cause to search in light of current
army law.
100. State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
101. Id. at 310, 354 N.E.2d at 718.
102. d. at 311, 354 N.E.2d at 719.
103. See notes 28-40 supra and accompanying text.
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use of dogs alone will not supply probable cause. The dogs merely
reinforce any previous foundations of suspicions already leveled
against the student. Without some previous information leading the
school official to particularize among the individual students, the
students may not be randomly searched by the dogs.
The Effect of the Use of Dogs on the Private Citizen Theory
As previously stated, a search by a private individual is not a
search under the restrictions of the fourth amendment.' If a school
official is considered a private person he is not bound by probable
cause requirements when searching a student."5 The extent to which
a school official's private-citizenship may be extended is unclear.
The question arises whether a school official may authorize a dog
search under the auspices of the in loco parentis doctrine without
causing the private search to be changed into a governmental
search. It appears he can not. The dogs used in the drug detection
are almost invariably trained by a law enforcement department such
as the local police' or the military. 7 As the "alert" of each dog is
individual to the dog itself, the dog's trainer must be controlling the
dog in order to get an accurate reading of the dog's responses. Thus
the search no longer remains one of a school official operating alone
within the public school system to maintain discipline; rather, it
becomes a joint action with the local law enforcement agencies.
What may have been merely a private search thus becomes a search
tainted with state action and thus subject to constitutional regula-
tion."'
The effect of police involvement in an otherwise private search
was analyzed in Picha v. Wieglos."09 In Picha, a student suspected of
possessing drugs was searched by a school nurse and psychologist.
The search was undertaken in connection with local police officers.
The court held that it was not necessary to decide the status of
the school official under the fourth amendment, since the search
104. See notes 10 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. Doe v. Renfrow, No. H 79-233, slip op. at 7, aff'd in par rev'd in par, No.
79-2116, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. 1980).
107. Lederer & Lederer, supra note 99, at 14.
108. See Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 101. 103-04, 73 Cal. Rptr.
575, 577, 447 P.2d 967, 969 (1969), where the search of petitioner's car was deemed part
of a joint operation by police and credit card agents. The court held that the official
participation in the planning and implementation of the overall operation was "suffi-
cient without more to taint with state action the subsequent acts of such credit card
agents." Id.
109. Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Il. 1976).
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was undertaken jointly with law enforcement officers. The court ex-
plained that since it is the responsibility of the police to find
evidence of crime, when a search is undertaken in connection with
police officers the standard of probable cause must be met to justify
the search under the fourth amendment. "' Therefore the court con-
cluded:
Although the school officials continued to act under
the color of their statutory school authority, the matter
became at least partly a quest for illegal items. As far as
the police are concerned, such an investigation cannot
come under the ambit of the state interest that dwells
under the banner of in loco parentis. Although the school
may have an interest in the safety of its charges, either
with regard to one student possessing drugs, or with
regard to the possibility that the student would transfer
the possession of the drugs to another student, all it can
do in furtherance of that interest is to locate, and perhaps
confiscate, the drugs. . . . Consequently the maintenance
of school discipline cannot be here said to temper the ap-
plication of the Constitution to a search caused by police
for evidence of crime."'
As the district court noted, school officials cannot operate joint-
ly with law enforcement without having their quasi-immunity under
the in loco parentis doctrine affected. To allow the school official to
operate under the in loco parentis concept, and at the same time
garner the assistance of the police makes a mockery of the in loco
parentis theory. Once school officials resort to the use of law en-
forcement to maintain control of drug possession in the schools, they
have stepped outside the bounds of the quasi-parental relationship
which previously had given them immunity from constitutional
restrictions. A school official who seeks assistance of the law en-
forcement agencies must do this at the cost of giving up the in loco
parentis immunity.
The Effect of the Use of Dogs on the Reasonable Cause Standard
The majority of jurisdictions consider the school official to be a
state agent, but subject to only a reduced standard of reasonable
cause, or reasonable suspicion in searching the students."' The ra-
110. Id at 1219.
111. Id at 1220, 1221.
112. See notes 53-86 supra and accompanying text.
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tionale for this reduced standard of reasonable cause is based on an
awareness of the unique circumstances of a school environment."' A
student search is more readily considered reasonable, even though
based on a minimal amount of evidence, than would be the search of
an adult based on similiar evidence. The student's right to be pro-
tected from unreasonable search and seizure, while not overlooked,
is balanced with the reasonableness of the search, based on the in-
dividual facts of the case. The use of dogs to aid in the student
search, however, may upset the balance between the lesser student
rights, and the reasonableness of the search. Any such balancing
must take into account both the reliability of the dogs to signal the
actual presence of drugs, and the effect that the use of dogs will
have on the school environment.
In order to adequately determine the reasonableness of the use
of dogs in the classroom, an initial inquiry must be made into the
dog's reliability and accuracy in alerting to the actual presence of
drugs on the individual. The reliability of the dogs used in drug
searches is an area unfortunately often overlooked or misunderstood
by the courts."4 The military courts are the only courts to actually
address the issue. While army law is not dispositive of or binding
precedent on this issue, the military's determination is persuasive
authority.
The military courts begin with the premise that for a dog to
supply probable cause to search, the dog must be "well trained and
well tested. ' '". The army requires that the commanding officer who
authorizes the search must prior to the search be specifically aware
of the dog's reliability. General knowledge that the dog has grad-
uated from a military drug detection course will not be held suffi-
cient reason to accept the dog's reliability without further inquiry."'
The reliability of the dog is subject to the interpretation of its
handler. Usually when a dog handler quotes a percentage reliability
for a dog he is stating the number of "finds" of "planted" marijuana
divided by the number of "plants.""7 The problem is that seldom
113. See note 63 supra.
114. For two opposing views on the reliability of the use of dogs to detect
marijuana see, Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect
Evidence of Crime, 44 FORD. L. REV. 973, 984-89 (1976); and Lederer & Lederer, supra
note 99.
115. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 434 (A.F.C.M.R. 1972). See also,
J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 177 (3d ed. 1940), on the reliability of bloodhound evidence.
116. Lederer & Lederer, supra note 99, at 14.
117. Id at 15.
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does the dog handler indicate the number of times that the dog has
falsely alerted. The dog will alert to the smell of a drug that has
been long since removed. The remaining odor is called a "dead
scent." The ability of a dog to tell the difference between an "actual
scent" and a "dead scent" is crucial for fourth amendment
purposes. " 8 The fourth amendment protects privacy; every alert of
the dog to a dead scent is an invasion of an innocent person. " 9
Even if the dog is known and proven to be accurate in its
alerts, it must still be determined whether the use of the dog is a
reasonable invasion of a student's privacy. The army has frequently
used dogs to search for drugs in a situation somewhat analogous to
the classroom, that of an army barracks. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Katz requires probable cause to search before a person's
expectation of privacy may be invaded. 2 ' A soldier billeted in the
barracks may not expect a dog search, but he is well aware that his
quarters are for many purposes public and open to members of the
command. 21 In one military decision it was suggested that the in-
dividual soldier had no expectation of substantial privacy. 2 There-
fore no cause is necessary to walk the dogs through the area; any
contraband found may be seized. 22
The same analogy may be drawn to the student's expectation
of privacy in the classroom. Indeed, the student may have less of an
expectation of privacy than the soldier. A soldier keeps all his pos-
session in his locker in the barracks and is provided no other area of
privacy during his military stay. The student, however, keeps only
those belongings in his locker needed to get him through the day,
and is not, by attending school, forced to forego any other sphere of
privacy.
The issue as to what is an unreasonable invasion of an in-
dividual's reasonable expectation of privacy remains in both these
settings. The military courts at least suggest that in an open bar-
racks, under the supervision and authority of a commanding officer,
the use of dogs does not constitute an unreasonable invasion of the
118. At least one case recites an even more drastic mistake. In Doe v. Renfrow
No. H 79-233 slip op. at 7, affd in par revd in par4 No. 79-2116 (7th Cir. 1980), a drug
detection dog alerted to a student. The student had been playing recently with her pet
dog, which was in heat.
119. Lederer & Lederer, supra note 99, at 15.
120. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
121. Lederer & Lederer, supra note 99, at 12.
122. United States v. Sumner, 34 C.M.R. 850 (A.F.B.R. 1964).
123. Id
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soldier's privacy. Under the Katz interpretation any intrusion into a
public area unprotected by a justifiable expectation of privacy is not
an unreasonable search per se.'24 Likewise, if the courts hold that a
student has no justifiable expectation of privacy in the classroom,
any search by the dogs will not be an unreasonable search per se.
Reasonableness will be determined, rather, by an examination of the
particular facts of the case.
Airport searches, now a part of every day air travel, provide a
second analogy whereby one may determine the reasonableness of a
mass search, undertaken without a warrant and without probable
cause. 2 ' The courts have consistently upheld these searches on
public policy reasons. The most widely used means of a search is the
walk-through magnetometer, a device activated by ferrous metal.' 6
Since their initial use, magnetometers have become increasingly so-
phisticated instruments of search, and are now used at a growing
number of airports. Each passenger is required to pass through the
magnetometer; if the instrument is activated, the passenger may be
subjected to a second and more extensive search. 2 '
It is agreed that airport searches do not fit into one of the
previously recognized exceptions. 8 for dispensing with a search war-
rant.'" A consensus of court holdings demonstrates that although
airport searches do not fit into one of the previously defined excep-
tions, they are not considered violative of the fourth amendment un-
less the search is unreasonable on the facts.'
Like the standard of reasonableness in dog searches, this reason-
able standard to search in airline search cases is found by balancing
the interests of society with the interests of the individual searched.
One writer has stated:
[Wihen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human
lives, and millions of dollars of property inherent in the
pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger
alone meets the test of reasonableness so long as the
search is conducted in good faith for the purposes of
124. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
127. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 497 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972).
128. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
129. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 498.
130. Id.
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preventing hijacking or like damages and with the
reasonable scope and the passenger has been given ad-
vance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can
avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.'
Piracy and hijacking were increasing to drastic proportions at the
time the airport searches were first mandated." 2 In comparison with
the intensity of the danger involved and the degree of the invasion
that an airlines magnetometer search would require, social utility
requires an individual search prior to boarding."3
The airlines setting can be distinguished from the school set-
ting by the degree of danger involved. The risk to the public is
much greater and more immediate in airline search cases. The
danger of student drug possession is not to be minimized. Yet the
degree of danger of student drug possession is to a large extent a
personal danger to the individual student possessing drugs, and not
to society at large. The drastic measures taken in airline cases
should be used only in an emergency.
One court in explaining the rationale for allowing the use of
massive search techniques in the airline cases stated, "What is clear
is that the public does have the expectation, or at least under our
Constitution the right to expect, that no matter the threat, the
search to counter it will be as limited as possible, consistent with
meeting the threat."" The magnetometer does not annoy, frighten,
or humiliate those who pass through it. Even the activation of the
alarm is no cause for concern, since such a large number of people
activate it in so many different ways, that no social stigma is attached
to the activation of a magnetometer.1
35
131. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
132. Between 1961 and 1968, hijackings of United States aircraft averaged
about one per year. In 1968, however, the number rose to 18. In 1969 there were 40 at-
tempted hijackings of United States aircraft, 33 successful. United States v. Davis, 482
F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973). See also, McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and
Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORD. L. REV. 293, 294-95 (1972).
133. In 1970, President Richard Nixon announced "A Program to Deal with
Airplane Hijacking." In part President Nixon said: "I have directed the Department of
Transportation to have American Flag carriers extend the use of surveillance tech-
niques to all gateway airports and other appropriate airports in the United States ...."
1970 Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon 742-43 (PUB. PAPERS). As the air-
port searches became more widespread and other aspects of the anti-hijacking pro-
gram took effect, the number of successful hijackings dramatically declined to 10 in
1972. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974).
134. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
135. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/4
DOG SEARCHES
Conversely, the use of dogs to search students is not such a
limited search. Student searches are not ordinary experiences. The
stigma cast upon the student may be a deeply humiliating ex-
perience. This intrusion is not one of momentary detention, but
rather is a major invasion into the student's privacy, and as such
should be considered unreasonable.
Moreover, in airline searches, a passenger has the option,
although perhaps impractical, of using alternative means of
transportation. No one is ever forced to undergo a magnetometer
search, but instead voluntarily consents as a requirement for air
travel."6 Anyone carrying illegal equipment onto the plane does so
at the risk of activating the magnetometer, and impliedly accepts
this risk. The student, however, has no option in school attendance.
State law mandates this school attendance. 7 If indiscriminate dog
searches are allowed, students may refuse the search only at the
risk of expulsion.
Airline searches are deemed reasonable in light of the balanc-
ing engaged in by the courts. The courts have weighed the degree
of invasion and the alternatives afforded to the passenger, with the
danger to society of air piracy. Because aircraft hijacking represents
an immediate threat to hundreds of lives, and because the invasion
of the passenger's privacy is minimal, the courts permit airport
searches in spite of a lack of probable cause.
Student searches involve no such immediate and drastic threat
to society. The balancing test for student searches involves a lesser
threat to society, and a deeper and more prolonged invasion of
fourth amendment rights. It is true that warrantless airport searches,
undertaken without probable cause, provide a somewhat analogous set-
ting to student searches. Student searches, however, can be
distinguished from the airport searches in light of the disparity be-
tween the danger involved, the degree of invasion to the individual,
and the lack of alternatives available to the students.
The airport searches represent an exception to the general
law of search and seizure. Quite consistently the courts have con-
demned mass warrantless searches. In a New York case an entiie
grade school class was individually taken and strip searched in an
effort to discover stolen money.'38 The court held that where there
136. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
137. See note 25 supra.
138. Belliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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were no facts which allowed school officials to particularize with
respect to which pupil might have possessed the stolen money,
search of the entire class was invalid under the Constitution, even
on a reduced standard of reasonable suspicion.139 The court stated
that it is essential to a proper search under the fourth amendment
that there must be some reason to single out an individual as giving
probable suspicion. For a mass class search to be valid there must
be some reasonable suspicion that each student possessed contra-
band or evidence of a crime.
The danger in the New York case was relatively small as com-
pared with the danger of drug possession. But even where greater
dangers are present the court jealously protects a person's right to
be free from random and indiscriminate mass searches. In Lankfelt
v. Gelstorn,"' police conducted searches of more than three hundred
houses, mostly private dwellings, searching for suspected murderers
thought to be hiding in the area. All the searches were based on
unverified anonymous tips. No search warrants were issued. In en-
joining the police action, the circuit court emphasized that "the par-
ties seeking redress have committed no acts warranting violation of
the privacy of their homes, there has never been any suspicion con-
cerning them or their associations. It cannot be contended that an
anonymous or unverified source is probable cause for the search of a
home."'
Thus, the court held that random indiscriminate searches will
be condemned in the courts. Furthermore, the court found that
there must be more than a minimal amount of evidence allowing the
police to particularize their search to a specific home or individual.
A search will not be justified when based only on unverified rumors
and anonymous tips.
Unverified tips were considered insufficient evidence to sup-
port probable cause in Lankfelt. Yet this is often all the evidence
that is available to the school official who is attempting to control
139. The student search was undertaken as an immediate result of the theft of
three dollars from one student. However, the defendant school official stated that they
were also aware of prior complaints from class members concerning missing money,
lunches, and other items. The defendants alleged that this afforded reasonable cause to
search the entire classroom. The court disagreed and held that in view of the slight
danger of the conduct involved, the extent of the search, and the age of the students
involved, it could not in good conscience say that the search undertaken was
reasonable. Id at 51, 54.
140. Lankfelt v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
141. Id at 201-02.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/4
DOG SEARCHES
drug possession in the school. While one can sympathize with the
school official's efforts, the use of dogs to indiscriminately search
each student should not be sanctioned by the law.
SUMMARY
Three theories have been advanced concerning the status of
school officials under the fourth amendment. Each theory will be af-
fected if dogs are used in the schools to search the students for
drugs. One jurisdiction has argued that a school official is a state
agent, and will be held to a strict standard of probable cause when
searching the students for drugs. In order for the school official to
authorize a dog search in such a jurisdiction, the official must first
be able to establish probable cause to allow the use of the dog. If
probable cause is established before the dog search, however, there
is no need for the dogs to further verify the presence of the drug.
The official may proceed to search the student without the use of
the dogs. Again, the use of dogs to search the entire classroom will
be precluded because probable cause must be found before such a
search can be authorized, and it is unlikely that probable cause can
be established for an entire classroom of students.
Other states hold that school officials are free from the restric-
tions of the fourth amendment, under a private citizen theory. This
private citizen exemption is destroyed, however, when the private
school official acts in cooperation with law enforcement officials.
Such cooperation between private and state officials will be held
joint action for the purposes of the fourth amendment, and the en-
tire search must meet the requirements of probable cause.
Finally, the majority of the courts acknowledge the school of-
ficial as an arm of the state government. These jurisdictions hold
the school official to a reduced standard of reasonable cause.
Although acting under the restrictions of the fourth amendment, the
school official may nonetheless search the student on less than prob-
able cause if the official has a reasonable suspicion that the student
possesses contraband. However, even with this lesser standard the
search must be reasonable under the circumstances of the particular
case. Reasonableness is determined by a weighing of the various fac-
tors involved. When dogs are used to search the students, the
reasonableness of the search becomes highly questionable. The dogs
are often unable to tell the difference between the actual presence
of the drug and merely a lingering scent of the drug on a student's
clothing after being near friends who smoked marijuana. Any
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mistake will force an innocent student to undergo a more intensive
search. In light of the possible emotional harm and social stigma
from such a search, and the likelihood of mistake, the use of the
dogs should be reserved for only very extreme emergencies.
CONCLUSION
Because student searches do not fit into the exceptions to the
warrant requirement, they must be reasonable on their facts if such
searches are to be considered constitutional. The two separate set-
tings where random warrantless searches have been held to be
reasonable can be readily distinguished. Airport searches are
distinguishable because the degree of danger of hijacking presents a
graver risk to society than the danger of the individual student's
drug possession. The military searches provide a more readily ap-
plicable analogy to the student search, because both the soldier and
the student have a limited expectation of privacy. However, because
of the potential for emotional harm involved in a search of innocent
children, what may be a reasonable search in a military barracks is
unreasonable in a public classroom.
Therefore, unless the Supreme Court sees the necessity to carve
out an exception to the warrant requirement for student searches, a
student search based on a dog's alert must be subject to fourth
amendment principles. The search must be based on probable cause
or must be considered reasonable in light of the facts. It is true that
the courts have expressed an occasional willingness to balance the
interests of society against the interests of the individual in an ef-
fort to determine the reasonableness of the search. If indeed in the
interests of society a search is deemed reasonable it will not be pro-
hibited by the fourth amendment. Nonetheless, while society's in-
terest in the prevention of drug abuse is entirely valid, it does not
outweigh the individual student's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Because dog searches alone have not been
shown to establish probable cause to search, a search based on a
dog's alert is unreasonable. Therefore, unwarranted use of dogs to
search students indiscriminately in the public schools must be pro-
hibited in the courts.
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